There may be sanctions for Iran, but who is going to fill in the pipelines then? The deal concluded by Russian and Azerbaijani energy holdings, made Nabucco prospects look still vaguer. One of the few options for the Southern Corridor, bypassing Russia, remains Shah Deniz II, in which the National Iran Oil Company has a stake. Consequently, EU wants the stability in the region to last, says Fabio Indeo, political researcher at the University of Camerino (Italy) in his interview to newcaucasus.com.
Do you think that, a deal between Gazprom and SOCAR on doubling gas supply from Azerbaijan, to 3 bln m3, with future increase, Russia can consider the idea of Nabucco discarded, at least for a time?
– Russian attempts to deepen energy cooperation with Azerbaijan are clearly geopolitically motivated because aimed to weaken a potential implementation of the EU-backed Southern energy corridor. However the Socar-Gazprom deal only represents another evident signal of the Nabucco project growing weakness, because currently the economic and geopolitical rationale of this energy corridor appears seriously affected by the idea to develop a Southern East Europe Pipelines and mainly the deal on the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline. The implementation of these projects and the others which Baku has decided to support (TAGP, BTE, the AGRI project based on LNG option, the interconnector ITGI, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline) will deprive Nabucco of the necessary amount of gas moreover, the lack of Turkmenistan’s strong commitment to support the EU Southern energy Corridor is destined to delay or to definitively stop the EU ambitions in the Caspian energy game.
In 2011, Turkmenistan has increased it oil exports through Baku- Tbilisi – Ceyhan from 1,17 to 2,24 mln tonnes (around 50% of its total oil expots in 2011). Could this mean that BTC could become an option of choice for Turkmenistan in the midterm?
I believe that Turkmenistan\’s decision to participate in the BTC oil pipeline could be interpreted according to different perspectives. Firstly the economic-geographic one, because Turkmen oil production and exports are limited and located on the shelves of the Caspian Sea: consequently, Ashgabat can easily exploit this opportunity, enhancing its position in a relevant energy corridor towards European markets. Secondly, Turkmenistan’s participation in BTC could be explained by the will to show a cooperation approach in the Caspian region with two important players, Azerbaijan and the West (EU and US): the aim to achieve with Baku is linked to the achievement of a deal on the disputed Serdar-Kapaz offshore oil field and to have a common position concerning the Caspian settlement. Moreover, Ashgabat’s oil exports towards BTC would represent a first stage of concrete energy cooperation with the West, even because the BTC was the first “pillar” of the East-West energy corridor launched at the end of 90’s.
Why do the EU officials turned to the US to fence Shah Deniz II against possible sanctions against Iran, who has a 10% stake in the project? Can this affect the bilateral relations between Baku and Tehran?
This European Union position towards US sanction against Iran clearly reflects the realpolitik approach of the EU in the region, mainly based on the needs of its energy security. In the EU perspective Shah Deniz II has a strategic relevance for the EU energy security strategy, mainly because 10 bcm of gas (of the planned 16 bcm which will be extracted from this field by 2017) represent the only source committed to the realization of the Southern corridor. The strengthening of the EU energy security by means of a pipeline bypassing Russian territory and Gazprom control – in order to lessen EU dependency from Russian imports – is also a strategic goal of the US, which consequently support EU attempts in this issue.
Moreover also a potential expulsion of NIOC by the Shah Deniz consortium is unlikely to happen, in order to avoid the risk of a temporary stop of the operations to begin the gas extraction and exports. Lastly, all geopolitical players involved in the region will surely seek to avoid a deterioration of Iranian-Azeri relations for several and often colliding strategies, but mostly linked to the need to maintain a condition of security and stability in order to preserve energy routes of exports (Turkey, EU, Azerbaijan, China, Central Asian nations, Russia).
Do you think that after the clashes at Zhanaozen in December 2011, Kazakhstan has managed to preserve its appeal both as an investment-friendly country in energy sector, and as a potential participant of Nabucco?
The riots in Zhanaozen and the other terrorist attacks occurred this year have undoubtedly damaged the image of stability which Kazakhstan has offered in these twenty years of independence. In my opinion the attractiveness of Kazakhstan for financial investments is not under discussion even because these threats to the stability are expression of social discontent and of economic distortions which must be coherently addressed, using the huge wealth deriving from oil exports to support an equitable growth of the country.
In addition, the multi vector policy adopted by the President Nazarbayev has allowed several geopolitical players and international energy companies to obtain strategic concessions in the Kazakh energy field: it is evident that their main goal will be to preserve a condition of stability in order to achieve their aims. Concerning the Kazakh potential participation in Nabucco, I believe that it is interesting to consider that this project is not the only option for Kazakh gas exports: the enhancement of the China-Central Asia gas pipeline capacity (better known as the Sino-Turkmen pipeline), the projects involving Azerbaijan both like an export hub and energy supplier, maybe the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) are relevant alternatives to take into consideration.
Aram Gareginyan, for newcaucasus.com
Photo from personal archive
