Background Factors of the Crisis
The military developments which started in South Ossetia in August 2008 have presently converted into a global crisis. Given a three-dimensional nature of the conflict, the elimination of the crisis is expected to be a very difficult task.
Firstly, the crisis has grown from the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation with a now decades old history arising from the imperialistic policy pursued in the Caucasus initially by Russia and afterwards by the Soviet Union. The intensity of the present antagonism has largely been pre-conditioned by the sanguinary conflicts which took place in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 1990s which have made this confrontation ethno-political by essence.
Secondly, the crisis is being caused by a complicated Russian-Georgian relationship dating back to the times of the late perestroika period with the absolute majority of the current Russian elite believing that it was the national liberation movement which began in Georgia at the end of the 1980s, amongst other things, that gave impulse to the collapse of the Soviet Union and, therefore, the weakening of Russia. At the same time, the policy line pursued by Georgia, which is aimed at democratic development and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, is perceived by the same elite as something hostile which presents danger to Russia. It is a common opinion in Russia that Georgia establishing itself as a pro-European democracy whilst acceding to NATO would create an existential threat to the country in terms of its maintaining its influence within the post-Soviet space and implementing its strategy of reviving itself as a Super-State following clearly neo-imperialistic ambitions. It is for these reasons and perceptions that Russian society sees Georgia as one of the most hostile states. With the imposition of economic sanctions or political measures, such as strengthening its Fifth Column, having failed to avert Georgia from pursuing its declared policy line, bringing the country into armed conflict through the manipulation of its existing conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia appeared to be the most effective means to this end.
Thirdly, being unsatisfied with the outcomes of the Cold War and suffering from an inferiority complex, Russia — by oppressing Georgia — seeks to gain its revenge upon the West and to change the established rule of law and order in the world through a gross violation of recognised norms and standards of international relations. This position of Russia presents a serious challenge to the West with the prevention of further growth in the tense relationship between the West and Russia likely to be largely dependent upon whether or not it will manage to force Russia back to the framework of civil behaviour.
Immediate Causes of the Crisis
Today, there is much dispute about who unleashed the war, Georgia or Russia. Indeed, it is important for historiography to find out what exactly happened on the night of 7 August but it is also necessary to look at the processes which preceded the development of the hostilities in order to remain unbiased in defining the responsibilities of the political crisis-makers. By making such an analysis, we can minimise the inconsistencies in the final report which appeared as a result of a deliberate distortion of the facts by propaganda makers or through the inaccuracy of technical information. Fairly stated, the responsibility for creating the prerequisites to the crisis also lies apart from the governments of Russia and Georgia with the heads of the separatist administrations, some international organisations and separate Western states.
Russian Trap
By the end of Vladimir Putin’s first term, it was readily obvious that Russia’s power was becoming more and more questionable within the post-Soviet space as a result of the “coloured revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine and with NATO’s eastward enlargement. Georgia had in fact accelerated the reforms required for integration into NATO whilst making an attempt to get the frozen processes of the settlement of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts moving from their dead stop. The “unfreezing” of these conflicts implied the sharp limitation of Russia’s monopolistic right and its role in the peace process, in the first instance. Georgian diplomacy succeeded in gaining the support of the international organisations and the leading Western states which proved completely unacceptable for Russia and which prompted it to “break down” Georgia itself through the imposition of severe economic sanctions in 2006.
After it became apparent that these attempts to bring about social problems and change Georgia’s policy line had failed, Russia decided to find another way. Moreover, time was of the essence in that it was becoming more and more difficult to rebuff the peaceful initiatives of conflict settlement process which were being suggested by the Government of Georgia, on one hand, and it was obvious that Georgia indeed had prospects for integrating into the Alliance at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in spring 2008. Within a perceived sense of urgency, Russia had no other option but to involve Georgia into its military provocation and to drive the situation in the conflict zones to the point of extreme tension. To this end, Russia began to develop the appropriate groundwork. In March 2008, it unilaterally abolished the economic embargo of 19 January 1996 which was imposed upon Abkhazia by the CIS-countries. In April of the same year, it initiated broad relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and introduced railway engineers and a landing party in Abkhazia alongside with the provision of heavy armament. Further, it constructed a military base in Java and simultaneously held military training exercises for its 58th Army near the Georgian border. It is especially noteworthy that the troops did not return to their point of permanent dislocation following the exercises but were supplied with ammunition, fuel and a food supply.
Obstinacy of Separatists
In an agreement with Russia, the separatist governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia adhered to an extremely implacable position in their relations with Georgia and systematically refused to consider the peaceful initiatives which were being suggested by the Government of Georgia or impartial third parties. The last defeat was the refusal of the peace plan presented by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank Walter Steinmeier, which was put before the conflict parties in June. At the same time, the separatist governments continued to blindly follow instructions from Russia and using farfetched or rather insignificant excuses, they either refused negotiations with Tbilisi or stubbornly insisted upon keeping to the already outdated framework of negotiations and peaceful operations. It is important to note that the separatist governments did not preclude Russia from the illegal concentration of its military potential within the conflict zones and which issued a challenge to Georgia.
Wrong Strategic Projecting by Georgia
It was a major strategic mistake on the part of the Government of Georgia to believe that in spite of a risk of potential obstruction from Russia it could attain both goals — the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity and integration into NATO — at the same time and within a relatively short period. It should also be noted that the Government of Georgia failed to put forward the right view for conflict settlement. The principal disadvantage of the Government’s approaches was to rely upon inconsistent and erroneous assumptions. Instead of immediately holding negotiations with the South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists, Tbilisi was searching for ways to exert pressure upon them, either directly or indirectly. The peaceful initiatives proposed by the Georgian side were primarily focused upon defining the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia within an integral state instead of progressively taking steps towards the re-establishment of relations and restoring credibility all of which provided an additional pretext for the separatists upon which to repudiate negotiations whilst indirectly facilitating Russia’s accomplishment of its plan designed to whip up the confrontation between the parties. Against this background, the position of conflict settlement by force was gradually gaining foothold in the Government of Georgia, giving more weight to arguments in favour of a rapid reinforcement of the national armed forces. In this situation, there was a quickly increasing risk of neglecting the messages which were received from the West which warned against provocations inspired by Russia. As we now see, the opinion of the Government of Georgia during the summer of 2008 was that the national army was indeed capable of addressing any military task in the case of provocation or provided there was a favourable situation.
Reluctance of the West
For a long time, the West hesitated to become actively involved in the settlement of the conflicts existing in Georgia. On one hand, such reluctance was accounted for by the “Russian factor” and, on the other hand, the Western powers simply did not know what to do. Although the US was relatively strongly set towards the Georgian conflicts, its role therein was limited mostly to providing political support to the peaceful initiatives of the Government. As for the European Union, it became interested in “unfreezing” the conflicts only after Georgia’s accession to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) although its interest was only moderate and Brussels always avoided playing the prime role in the settlement of conflicts. In the course of the negotiations on the ENP Action Plan, more than one fierce discussion took place before the issue of conflict settlement was set amongst the other priorities on the agenda of the EU-Georgian co-operation. Still, measures reflected in the ENP Action Plan were not properly specified but only mentioned that the mechanism for negotiations should be made more efficient, the role of EU Special Representative in the South Caucasus should increase, the territorial integrity of Georgia and the settlement of its internal conflicts be included in the framework of the EU-Russia dialogue and so on. The ENP Action Plan for conflict settlement, therefore, does not envisage any specific steps with a view to increasing the EU’s role. Remarkably, the first serious efforts in this direction were taken by the Europeans following the NATO Summit held in April of the current year at which the decision to grant Georgia the MAP was not taken in the main as a result of the position of one group of European members of the Alliance. Unfortunately, these member states put forward enough arguments to justify their position which then enticed Russia into action in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and challenging the sovereignty of Georgia. After it became clear to the world how Russia had progressively strained the situation in the conflict zones, there is no doubt that the Europeans must have felt remorse which prompted them to take active steps towards resolving these conflicts within the EU framework. First, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, tried to sound out the possibilities for intermediation between the parties to the conflict followed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Frank Walter Steinmeier, who visited the region with a specially developed peace plan. Unfortunately, however, it was already too late for such actions as Russia was strongly committed to following its own plan and at once “buried” the initiatives of Messrs Solana and Steinmeier.
The abovementioned, however, enabled the initiation of military actions in South Ossetia and, as also noted, all of the parties concerned are more or less responsible for the ensuing vents.
What is the Way out of this Situation?
The August crisis, with its impact upon both regional and global security, will most likely remain in the focus of politicians and political scientists for a long period of time, primarily because of the interest in finding the answers to four key questions:
a) Will it be possible to renew a normal process of building the state system in Georgia and, therefore, prevent the spreading of destabilisation to other countries and regions?
b) Will it be possible to “tame” an authoritarian and now stronger Russia and keep international relations within a civil framework?
c) Will the EU and its foreign policy and security instruments prove efficient in resolving these aforementioned objectives?
d) What is the place and role of NATO in the architecture of European security within the context of the August events in Georgia?
Today, there are no ready answers to these questions but there is no doubt that the process of analysing these developments is still underway. The August crisis was a sort of “wake up call” to the world which showed that it was time for a reassessment of values, the destruction of stereotypes and the formation of a new outlook.
Because of a number of historical or geopolitical factors, the whole weight of alleviating the conflict and overcoming the crisis fell upon the EU whilst the US, for reasons of theist presidential elections and ongoing domestic administrative changes, remained in the background with its support mostly limited to making political declarations and estimations. Washington naturally plays its “supporting role” whilst underpinning the EU positions in the pending dialogue with Russia. Remarkably, the concerted position of the US and Europe in the appraisal of the aggressive actions from Russia and with regards to the volume and forms of assistance to Georgia has apparently strengthened the transatlantic concordance which, until recently, seemed to have somewhat weakened. This is a necessary prerequisite to achieving any success in “taming” Russia.
The main objective of the West today is to make Moscow realise that it will not be able to escape punishment for flexing its muscles in the post-Soviet space but that it will have to pay a high political and economic cost instead. Moscow should also understand that the occupation of neighbouring states creates a discord in any partnership with the West which is something vitally important for Russia given its technological backwardness. At the same time, the EU is undoubtedly facing a dilemma. On the one hand, it is impossible to ignore Russian intervention into a neighbouring country but, on the other hand, the EU has to co-operate with Russia for the sake of stability in the region. This alone is enough for the EU to refrain from the application of any substantial sanctions towards Moscow. The European Union will have to either co-operate with Russia in order to stabilise the situation in Georgia, and inter alia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, or seriously consider the imposing of sanctions. It is impossible, however, for both of these things to be done at the same time. The stabilisation of the situation in Georgia, however, requires that a maximum involvement of the EU must be made a priority whilst simultaneously making sure that Russia does not feel isolated. It is no over emphasis to say that anything can be expected from Russia if it is backed into a corner. For its part, Russia should also realise that its limited co-operation with the West may entail more negative effects in the long run which will be more severe than short-term diplomatic sanctions. In light of these factors, the EU should act decisively in order to achieve security within the six-point cease-fire framework and make Moscow choose between co-operation or conciliation within its cooling relationship with the West.
Archil Gegeshidze,
\”Crisis in Georgia, 2008. Preconditions, Reality, Perspectives\”,
Independent Experts\’ Club
